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ARTICLES
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL
REMEDIES. AGAINST STATE ACTIVITIES
WAYNE MCCORMACK*

Much confusion has surrounded the propriety of granting various
federal court remedies against states, state courts, and state officials
during the past decade. During the 1973 term the United States
Supreme Court faced two cases raising questions of federalism in
the granting of federal remedies for state action; the opinions in
both cases fell short of resolving the difficulties, however. In particular, the use of declaratory judgments to affect pending or threatened
state criminal prosecutions has varied in federal litigation. The nonintervention doctrine regarding injunctive relief and the abstension
doctrine,' along with vague notions of comity, have inhibited federal
courts from intervening into state court proceedings. In Steffel v.
Thompson,2 the Court authorized declaratory relief from allegedly
unconstitutional prosecutions, but the broad range of opinions filed
by the Justices leaves open questions regarding the effect of the
remedy upon subsequent state proceedings. Similarly, the eleventh
amendment and the closely related doctrine of sovereign immunity
also have generated confusion when monetary relief is sought
3 addressed
against a state. Edelman v. Jordan
this problem and,
from the opinions in that case, an explanation of the amendment
as a broad equitable guidepost for the courts can be extracted.
* B.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. See notes 32-45 infra & accompanying text.
2. 94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974).
3. 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

Steffel v. Thompson4 breathed new life into the declaratory judgment remedy. When Steffel distributed handbills against the Vietnam War in the parking lot of an Atlanta shopping center in October 1970, the police threatened to arrest him and his friends for
criminal trespass if they continued. Upon the return of the protesters two days later to pass out more handbills, the police again were
called; Steffel left, but a friend stayed and was arrested for criminal
trespass. Steffel then brought suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief against enforcement of the criminal trespass statute as it was
applied "to interfere with petitioner's constitutionally protected
activities." 5 The district court denied all relief,' and Steffel appealed,7 claiming that declaratory relief should have been granted
despite the refusal to allow injunctive relief. In an opinion by Justice
Brennan, the Supreme Court held that the district court should
4. 94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974).
5. Id. at 1213-14.
6. The district court relied on a broad reading of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), equating declaratory and injunctive relief and
requiring a showing of bad faith harassment as a prerequisite for either form of relief. Without
a showing of bad faith, "the rudiments of an active controversy between parties" did not exist.
Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386, 1389-90 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
7. Some difficult preliminary questions existed with regard to appellate jurisdiction. The
case initially had been dismissed by a single district judge, whose ruling was appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit despite the possibility that a three-judge court should
have been convened and direct appeal taken to the Supreme Court. Since the request for
injunctive relief was abandoned on appeal from the district court, the Supreme Court held
that the court of appeals did not err by exercising jurisdiction on appeal. 94 S. Ct. at 1214
n.7.
The Court, stating that a three-judge court is required even when the statute is challenged
as applied rather than on its face, id., relied upon Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940),
despite its seemingly opposite result. The salient language from Bransford reads:
It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground
of unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge court,
and a petition which seeks an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as
unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a three-judge court.
Id. at 361. By looking at the nature of the plaintiff rather than the'nature of the attack, as
the language suggests, this distinction is understandable. If the plaintiff's claim is that no
similar statute ever could be applied to him for reasons intrinsic to that particular plaintiff,
such as his religious or governmental character, then the statute itself might be invalid in
part, necessitating a three-judge court. See, e.g., Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486 (1942)
(military post exchange held constitutionally exempt from state sales taxes); cf. DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921) (direct appeal from state court). If the
plaintiff could be reached by a uniformly applied statute, but claims discriminatory treatment by an administrator, then it is only the official's action that is being challenged. Cf
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (no direct appeal from state court).
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have entertained the request for a declaratory judgment. 8 To understand fully the significance of the Court's holding first requires a
delineation of the contraints that have been variously applied to
requests for federal intervention, equitable as well as declaratory,
into state proceedings.
EquitableIntervention
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,I concerning four plaintiffs arrested but
not prosecuted for violation of a state antisubversive statute, the
Supreme Court.confronted a unique case in which all prerequisites
for equitable intervention were present. Although their offices had
been ransacked and files seized pursuant to the arrests, the fact that
the plaintiffs were never prosecuted precluded them from the legal
remedy of asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute as a defense in a criminal trial. Continued arrests with hearings barred by
a failure to prosecute accentuated the inadequacy of available legal
remedies,' 0 while the "chilling effect" of the harassing arrests upon
the political activities of not only the plaintiffs but also their colleagues constituted irreparable harm."1 The traditional grounds for
equitable intervention thus were present.
The Court later emphasized in Cameron v. Johnson 2 that the
requisite irreparable harm would not be found lightly. In Cameron
the plaintiffs in federal court were defendants in a pending state
criminal trepass prosecution. The Supreme Court determined that
they would be able to assert their constitutional claims in the state
action, while any chilling effect on other political activities would
be no more than the normal deterrent effect of any criminal statute.13 Indeed, some chilling effect upon the activities of persons who
fall within or approach the ambit of the statute is the precise purpose of any criminal provision." Cameron therefore presented no
traditional bases for equitable intervention; an adequate remedy
existed in the state courts, and no abnormal irreparable harm had
been demonstrated. In the years following Dombrowski there was
8. The Court, taking judicial notice of "the recent developments reducing the Nation's
involvement in that part of the world," directed the district court on remand to consider first
whether the case might be moot. 94 S. Ct. at 1216.
9. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Id. at 485-89.
11. Id.
12. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
13. Id. at 619.
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51-52 (1971).
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nevertheless much intervention by the federal courts into state prosecutions, often with no more basis than a federal court's perception
5
of the unconstitutionality of a state criminal statute.
Dombrowski, where the federal relief was allowed because no
other forum was available in which to present federal claims and
where irreparable harm had been found because of the lack of opportunity to defend against a criminal prosecution, never was intended
to be extended so far, however; Younger v. Harris" brought the
extension to an abrupt halt. In Younger, a state prosecution was
pending for violation of a criminal anarchy statute of the type that
previously had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. 7 The district court held the statute's patent unconstitutionality sufficient to justify relief in light of the inhibitory effect
that prosecutions would have on political activities. 8 Because it was
not shown that the statute's unconstitutionality would be unavailable as a defense to the prosecution, however, the Supreme Court saw
no irreparable harm in the form of a chilling effect upon political
activity other than the normal deterrent effect of a criminal stat9
ute.'
Younger was merely an example of a court of equity unwilling to
intervene in the proceedings of another court system, whether under
the same or a different sovereign, absent a demonstration of inadequate remedy for the plaintiff's claims in that other system. This
traditional doctrine, founded historically on the Court of Chancery's
disputes with the seventeenth-century courts of law," unfortunately
was recast by Younger to be required by "Our Federalism," ' 21 indicating that the American system had spawned unique doctrines.
Some lower federal courts have viewed this language as a mandate
to withhold all relief for constitutional claims whenever there is
15. See, e.g., Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D.Mass. 1969); Stein v. Batchelor,
300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
16. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
17. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ohio criminal syndicalism statute
which punished advocacy and prohibited assembly to advocate action described in the statute
held violative of first and fourteenth amendments).
18. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
19. Two members of the Progressive Labor Party and a college history instructor intervened as plaintiffs in the federal suit, alleging that they would "feel inhibited" if the prosecution were not enjoined. The Supreme Court held that they were not proper parties because
they had not been threatened with prosecution. 401 U.S. at 42.
20. See, e.g., 1 W. HoLnSWORTH, A HisToRY op ENGUSH LAw 459-65 (6th ed. 1938); F.
MArLAND, EQurTy, ALso Ta FoRMs op AcTIoN 2-10 (1909).
21. 401 U.S. at 53.
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either a possibility of interference with state court proceedings or
the possible availability of a state court remedy.2 Such a broad
reading of Younger is unwarranted since traditional equity principles allow proceedings of another court system to be enjoined under
proper circumstances. Moreover, the Supreme Court never has required exhaustion of state judicial remedies,23 but only withheld
federal relief if it would disrupt a state proceeding that could itself
provide an adequate remedy. 2
That the opinion in Younger is consistent with traditional equitable notions of non-intervention can be demonstrated by analyzing
recent. Supreme Court cases in which relief was granted against
actions in nonjudicial systems. Parisiv. Davidsons allowed federal
habeas corpus intervention into the proceedings of military courtsmartial because the Court was unwilling to extend full comity to an
adjudicatory system that was neither a court of law nor a court of
another sovereign. 5 Gibson v. Berryhill allowed federal injunctive
relief against a state administrative proceeding to revoke the plaintiff's optometry license because the Court was unwilling to apply
comity to a nonjudicial state proceeding. In each case comity was
embodied in the traditional notion that equity, although it will not
intervene in another court system, will protect against excesses of
governmental agencies before they can inflict irreparable harm on
an individual. In each case the Court dealt lightly with the question
22. See, e.g., Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing to compel county

jury commissioners to comply faithfully with Georgia's statutory scheme for selection of
traverse jurors because, as a matter of comity, the state courts should be given the opportun-

ity to effect compliance); Schwartz v. Wyffels, 326 F. Supp. 284 (D. Ore. 1971) (student
denied relief from school hair regulation because state courts were not impotent and the
question was not substantially federal); Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971)

(without a showing of special circumstances, injury, or bad faith prosecution, a federal court
not to intrude into state criminal prosecutions).
23. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
24. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 24344 (1926). Of course, if there are no pending state court proceedings to be disrupted, then it

is difficult to show irreparable harm, maximizing the importance of declaratory relief, which
is available without the necessity of such a showing.
Cases holding that one challenging a criminal statute has no standing or presents no
controversy (see notes 67-69 infra & accompanying text) might be explained more easily as
cases in which no irreparable harm, necessary for equitable intervention, was shown. Steffel
thus might broaden the traditional limits of the standing doctrine by focusing instead on the

availability of particular forms of relief.
25. 405 U.S. 34 (1972).

26. As Justice Douglas succinctly stated: "Mhe Pentagon is not yet sovereign." Id. at
51 (concurring opinion).
27. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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of whether the proceeding would provide an adequate remedy for
the plaintiff's contentions. 28 Concurring opinions in each case emphasized that demonstration of the inadequacy of a nonjudicial
remedy should not be necessary so long as there is a present controversy.29 Even when dealing with nonjudicial proceedings of a coequal branch of the federal government, a type of review which often
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, 3 the question of
whether to grant equitable relief is basically a question of whether
irreparable harm will result if relief is denied.3 1
Equity-Abstention Distinctions
In the years between Dombrowski and Younger, the Court continually distinguished between injunctive and declaratory relief in the
context of federal claims against state prosecutions. The distinction
originally was drawn in Dombrowski when the Court dealt separately with the questions of abstention and equitable jurisdiction.
Under the heading of abstention the Court considered whether a
declaratory judgment against the constitutionality of the state statute could be issued by the federal court when no prosecution had
occurred. The abstention doctine mandated a state adjudication if
the statute was unclear as a matter of state law to allow the state
courts to limit the statute by construction to avoid the constitutional questions, 32 the Court not being concerned with establishing
possible irreparable harm for the purposes of the abstention doctrine." To find equitable jurisdiction, however, required a showing
of irreparable harm and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.34
The most articulate discussion of these principles came in
28. 411 U.S. at 574-75; 405 U.S. at 42.
29. 411 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J.); 405 U.S. at 50-51 (Douglas, J.).
30. Exhaustion of federal administrative remedies often is required, partly because of
separation of powers problems, partly for judicial economy, but most often because a case is
not yet ready for equitable intervention. See L. JArs, JuDicIAL CONTROL OF ADMimsTRATIV
AcaoN 425-27, 439-40 (1965).
31. The applicability of equitable principles in this context was demonstrated in Sampson
v. Murray, 94 S. Ct. 937 .(1974), although the Court's finding of no irreparable harm was
troubling. In Sampson, a discharged probationary federal employee was held not to be entitled to interim relief of reinstatement pending Civil Service Commission review. If ultimately
determined that she had been discharged wrongfully, the availability of backpay would

prevent irreparable injury. Id. at 952-53. The Court emphasized, however, that jurisdiction
to grant the requested relief would exist if the equitable prerequisites were met. Id. at 952.
32. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
33. 380 U.S. at 489-92.
34. Id. at 485-89.
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Zwickler v. Koota,3 in which the Supreme Court reversed a threejudge court decision to abstain in a challenge to a New York statute
requiring political handbills to contain the publisher's name. The
Court separated very clearly the question of abstention in a declaratory judgment action from the question of appropriateness of equitable relief. Abstention was not mandated because the statute was
not susceptible to a limiting construction that could avoid the constitutional issue;s declaratory relief therefore could be granted without waiting for a state adjudication to clarify the statute as a matter
of state law.37 Equitable jurisdiction of the federal court, however,
would be limited by traditional notions of non-intervention into the
judicial processes of another court system." The Court asserted:
"[A] federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its
conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.""9
Thus, when denying equitable relief in Cameron v. Johnson,"'the
Court decided on the merits that the statute under which state
prosecutions were pending was not unconstitutional on its face4
before considering the plaintiffs' contentions that enforcement of
the statute violated their constitutional rights. The latter half of the
opinion then discussed whether the state prosecutions would result
in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and their sympathizers if federal relief was not granted, leading to a finding that the state prose35. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
36. Id. at 249-52.
37. Id. at 250-51.

38. See note 20 supra & accompanying text. The Zwickler Court relied heavily on Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), in which injunctive relief against enforcement of a

city solicitation license ordinance had been denied. The ordinance was held invalid as applied
to religious solicitation in a companion criminal case, Murdoek v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943), but equity jurisdiction was precluded by the lack of "any injury other than that
incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, supra at 164. The Court in Douglas distinguished Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496

(1939), as a case in which state officials had resorted to extralegal tactics similar to those later
found in Dombrowski. 319 U.S. at 164.
39. 389 U.S. at 254. In Zwickler there was no pending prosecution that might be interrupted by federal equitable relief. Indeed, it was held on appeal after remand that the

controversy was moot because the plaintiff did not show that he intended to continue handbilling anonymously, leaving no current threat of prosecution. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S.
103 (1969). Thus, declaratory relief was unavailable for the same reason that equitable relief
was unavailable: there was no present controversy between the parties. Declaratory relief, of
course, would have been available as it was in Steffel, if the plaintiff had contemplated
further action and'prosecution was threatened by the state against that action.
40. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
41. Id. at 615-17.
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cutions presented a complete and adequate remedy at law for the
plaintiffs' federal claims.42
These principles were confused, however, in a companion case to
Younger, Samuels v. Mackell,43 in which the Supreme Court held
that declaratory relief ordinarily would not be available when equitable relief was unavailable. The Court equated the two forms of
relief because declaratory relief presumably would have res judicata
effects on the federal issues and could be followed by injunctive
relief to "protect or effectuate" the federal court judgment by intervention into pending state proceedings. 4 The Court did note in
Samuels, however, that it was leaving open the question, subsequently resolved in Steffel, whether declaratory relief could be issued in the absence of a pending state proceeding. 5
Steffel differed from Samuels because in Steffel there was no
actual prosecution to be stopped by federal intervention, nor was
there threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff beyond the normal
results of a good faith criminal sanction, although a present dispute
did exist because of the threatened prosecution. In Steffel therefore
the Court was presented with a situtation in which equitable relief
was unavailable, and indeed unnecessary, but in which an actual
dispute necessitated clarification of the appropriateness of declaratory relief untrammeled by the confusing possibility of an equitable
remedy that led the Court astray in Samuels. This distinction justi42. Id. at 620. The dissent argued that the record showed factually that the statute was

not being used in good faith but rather that the state criminal process was being "abusively
invoked 'without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage' the assertion of constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 623 (Fortes, J.), quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 490 (1965).
43. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Samuels was an action for injunctive and declaratory relief by

defendants in pending state prosecutions under a criminal anarchy statute. The Court held
that, where state proceedings had commenced, federal courts should apply the same equitable principles relevant to injunctive relief to a request for declaratory judgment.
44. The Court stated:
In both situations deeply rooted and long-settled principles of equity have narrowly restricted the scope for federal intervention, and ordinarily a declaratory
judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of
state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid. . . . We therefore hold that, in cases where the state criminal
prosecution was begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable principles
relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be taken into consideration by
federal district courts in determing whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and
that where an injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well.
Id. at 72-73.
45. Id. at 73-74.
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fled the Court's holding that the request for declaratory relief should
have been heard in Steffel.
Effects of a DeclaratoryJudgment on State Proceedings
Steffel's holding that a proper situation was presented for declaratory relief necessitates examination of the ultimate effects of such
relief on subsequent state prosecutions. The inquiry requires some
attention to historical background as well as reference to the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act" itself, which provides that
the "declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree"47 and that coercive relief will be available when needed
following the declaratory judgment." Prior to passage of the Act, the
Supreme Court had taken the position that the federal courts were
prohibited from issuing declaratory judgments by the same principles that prohibit their rendering advisory opinions to other
branches of government.49 Nonetheless, some states simultaneously
were developing noncoercive remedies, including the declaratory
judgment, since such relief facilitated adjudication of rights without
the necessity to commit an act that might subject litigants to substantial liability; it allowed parties to ascertain their future legal
status or the potential rights and liabilities that would flow from
anticipated conduct." The declaratory judgment was to be a final
ruling, binding through principles of res judicata, when the future
point in time arrived or if the anticipated conduct in fact occurred.51
This history was traced briefly in Steffel, relating it to the developments of the early part of this century concerning injunctive relief
against state regulatory measures. The Court found a close connection between the passage of the three-judge court act 52 in 1910, to
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
47. Id. § 2201.
48. Id. § 2202.
49. See Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928).
50. The remedy's primary advocates were Professors Borchard and Sunderland. See Borchard, The DeclaratoryJudgment-A Needed ProceduralReform, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918);
Sunderland, A Modem Evolution in Remedial Rights, 16 MICH. L. Rav. 69 (1917).
51. Relief also would be provided when all contingencies had occurred, although coercive
relief had not been sought. SeegenerallyE.BoRcHAR, DECLAEATORYJUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941);
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CourTS 446-47 (2d ed. 1970).
52. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281-84 (1970). Section 2283 provides: "A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect its judgments."
Section 2281 provides:
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deter injunctive relief against state regulatory measures, and the
passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934, to provide a forum
for litigating federal claims against state regulations without necessitating violations of those regulations and exposure to potential
liability. 3 The legislative history demonstrated that "'the declaratory judgment was designed to be available to test state criminal
statutes in circumstances where an injunction would not be
appropriate.' "51
The effect of a declaratory judgment was considered only lightly
by the Steffel majority in referring to its "persuasive force." 5 The
Court reiterated the following language from an earlier opinion:
"[E]ven though a declaratory judgment has 'the force and effect
of a final judgment' . . . it is a much milder form of relief than an
injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but it is not
contempt."5 The Court did not predict the results if a state prosecution were commenced subsequent to a federal declaratory judgment
holding the enforced statute unconstitutional either on its face or as
applied.
Two concurring opinions did assert views on the proper effect of
declaratory relief. Justice White indicated that a federal declaratory
judgment should bind a state court, the judgment being enforceable
through injunctions against subsequent state prosecutions.5 7 But,
according to Justice Rehnquist, this approach would enable a federal court to bootstrap itself into providing equitable relief that it
would be unable to offer if the suit had not been filed until a state
prosecution had been commenced. 8
A significant difference exists, however, between an injunction
issued as an initial matter against a pending state prosecution and
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
53. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Steffel, quoted his own opinion in Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (1971), in which he had explicated this connection more fully.
94 S. Ct. at 1219-20.

54. 94 S. Ct. at 1219-20, quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 112 (1971).
55. 94 S. Ct. at 1221.

56. Id. at 1221, quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-26 (1971).
57. 94 S. Ct. at 1225.
58. Id. at 1226-27.
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an injunction issued to enforce a prior declaratory judgment: the
latter is based upon a final judgment that is entitled to res judicata
treatment. Justice Rehnquist thus too tightly constrained the declaratory judgment concept, particularly as it relates to equitable jurisdiction, by his belief that its only function is to clarify the law. That
he felt the same considerations were involved in enjoining a state
prosecution whether or not a federal declaratory judgment had been
issued previously 9 is revealed by his perception of the judgment's
value and effect as a nonbinding order." This view cannot be reconciled with the Declaratory Judgment Act and the cases construing
it, which demonstrate that the judgment indeed is "a binding order
supplemented by continuing sanctions."'" It is precisely this nature
that distinguishes the judgment from an advisory opinion and saves
the constitutionality of the Act. 2
59. Justice Rehnquist observed:
If the rationale of cases such as Younger and Samuels turned in any way upon
the relative ease with which a federal district court could reach a conclusion
about the constitutionality of a challenged state statute, a preexisting judgment
declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular plaintiff would
of course be a factor favoring the issuance of an injunction as "further relief"
under the Declaratory Judgments Act. But, except for statutes that are "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph" . . . the rationale of those cases had no such
basis. Their direction that federal courts not interfere with state prosecutions
does not vary depending on the closeness of the constitutional issue or on the
degree of confidence which the federal court possesses in the correctness of its
conclusions on the constitutional point. Those decisions instead depend upon
considerations relevant to the harmonious operation of separate federal and
state court systems, with a special regard for the state's interest in enforcing its
own criminal laws, considerations which are as relevant in guiding the action of
a federal court which has previously issued a declaratory judgment as they are
in guiding the action of one which has not.
Id. at 1227.
60. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
A declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights, not a binding order
supplemented by continuing sanctions. State authorities may choose to be
guided by the judgment of a lower federal court, but they are not compelled to
follow the decision by threat of contempt or other penalties. If the federal plaintiff pursues the conduct for which he was previously threatened with arrest and
is in fact arrested, he may not return the controversy to federal court, although
he may of course raise the federal declaratory judgment in the state court for
whatever value it may prove to have.
Id.
61. See note 60 supra. The Act itself speaks of a final judgment supplemented by "further
necessary or proper relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
In Teas v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 413 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1969), it was held that
an injunction could be issued against state court proceedings following a declaratory judgment. The court noted that the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), contained
an express exception to effectuate judgments of federal courts. 413 F.2d at 1267.
62. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
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More fundamental difficulties are revealed by Justice Rehnquist's
footnoted explanation of the declaratory judgment's value if introduced in the state court:
The Court's opinion notes that the possible resjudicataeffect
of a federal declaratory judgment in a subsequent state court
prosecution is a question "not free from difficulty". . . . I express no opinion on that issue here. However, I do note that the
federal decision would not be accorded the stare decisis effect
in state court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding
within the same federal jurisdiction. Although the state court
would not be compelled to follow the federal holding, the opinion might of 'course be viewed as highly persuasive."
This language presents two separate problems. First is the question
of what is made res judicata as a result of the judgment; to be
constitutional the declaratory judgment must be res judicata of
something approaching a case or controversy. A further question
concerns the effect of the judgment on matters for which it is not
res judicata, specifically, the extent to which a state court is bound
under the principles of stare decisis by a constitutional law decision
issued by a lower federal court; in a sense the latter question is the
converse of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 4
Res Judicata
To determine the res judicata effects of a federal declaratory judgment on subsequent state court proceedings, it is helpful to consider
the facts presented in SteffeI in light of the equitable principles
enunciated in Younger. Assume for example that, after obtaining a
declaratory judgment pertaining to the two prior incidents and
without ever having returned to the shopping center, Steffel were to
be arrested because of the prior incidents. To issue injunctive relief
under these circumstances to protect the federal court's prior judgment is not the type of intervention into the proceedings of another
court system that equity condemns; it is instead merely recognition
of the prior jurisdiction of the federal court. The federal court's
injunctive relief then can be used to effectuate its own judgment.65
63. 94 S. Ct. at 1227 n.3.
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65. In Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), the Supreme Court held that
a federal court could not enjoin state court relitigation of claims decided previously by the
federal court. The 1948 revision of the anti-injunction statute, however, provided an exception
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If a declaratory judgment may be issued when a live dispute exists
without expressing any disrespect for state courts, allowing a subsequent state prosecution to proceed after the issuance of such a judgment would permit state officials to express flagrant disrespect for
the federal courts.
It would not do, however, to allow such bootstrapping by the
federal courts on a broad basis. Although a federal injunction should
be available to effectuate a federal court's judgment and thereby to
protect the finality ofjudgments, subsequent injunctive relief serves
this purpose only if the controversy before the state court is identical
to that resolved in the prior federal suit, thus activating the res
judicata doctrine. 6 To determine the issue of identity requires first
a delineation of the "case or controversy" requirement and a differentation between declaratory judgments of facial invalidity of a
statute and a judgment of invalidity as applied.
It has long been the Supreme Court's policy that assertion of
constitutional protection from criminal sanctions may not be tested
without first committing the prohibited offense. This requirement
has been cast in various terms, sometimes using "ripeness,"'6 7 more
often "standing,"6 s and most often the straightforward question of
whether the parties have satisfied constitutional "case or controversy" requirements.69 For example, workers have been barred from
challenging the federal restrictions on political activity prior to engaging in such conduct because the Court could not foresee all of
the forms and consequences of their expected activities, 0 even
though the statute was challenged on its face rather than as applied
for a federal court "to protect or effectuate its judgments," 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), and this
provision has been applied to enjoin relitigation followinga declaratory judgment. Teas v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 413 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1969).
66. Lack of identity raises the question of stare decisis effects. See notes 87-128 infra &
accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
68. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943).
69. See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); cf.
L. JAPma, supra note 30, at 395.
70. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Justice Douglas, in dissent,
urged that the case was particulary appropriate for a declaratory judgment regarding the
present status of government workers. He emphasized that legal remedies would be inadequate for those "who must sacrifice their means of livelihood in order to test their rights to
their jobs." Id. at 117. "The threat against them is real not fanciful, immediate not remote.
The case is therefore an actual not a hypothetical one. And the present case seems to me a
good example of a situation where uncertainty, peril, and insecurity result from imminent
and immediate threats to asserted rights." Id. at 119-20.
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to the specified future conduct. 7'

The need for an actual conflict also was demonstrated, shortly
before Steffel was decided, when the Court held in O'Shea v.
Littleton72 that no case or controversy was presented in a suit to
enjoin state judges who allegedly exercised racial discrimination
when setting bail and sentencing criminal defendants. In the strifetorn racial hotbed in which the case arose, there was undoubtedly
a "live dispute. '73 What the Court found lacking, however, were
believable allegations that the plaintiffs themselves would be subjected to unconstitutional prosecutions, regardless of the judges'
74
past conduct.
71. The Court occasionally has recognized the existence of a live controversy based on an
explicit threat of prosecution, but it has limited this approach to cases involving a challenge
to the face of the statute, see, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), or at
least a challenge of invalidity as applied to a class of persons whose claims to constitutional
protection are intrinsic to themselves, as in the case of religious beliefs, see, e.g., Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), the Court rejected a broad facial
challenge to a New York statute, dealing with alleged subversives in public schools, with only
Justice Frankfurter perceiving a justiciability problem. When portions of the law later were
struck down, the Court explained Adler as "a declaratory judgment suit in which the Court
held, in effect, that there was no constitutional infirmity in [the statutes] on their faces and
that they were capable of constitutional application." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 594 (1967).
72. 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974).
73. Justice Douglas noted in dissent: "We know from the record and oral argument that
Cairo, Illinois, is boiling with racial conflicts." Id. at 681. This was an understatement that
does not reflect fully the scene of almost continuous violence over the past decade as it was
portrayed in the pleadings and exhibits.
74. The Court implied that the plaintiffs could prevent future discrimination:
Of course, past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury. But here the prospect of future injury rests
on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and charged with
violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings,
trial, or sentencing before petitioners. Important to this assessment is the absence of allegations that any relevant criminal statute of the State of Illinois is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied or that plaintiffs have been or will be
improperly charged with violating criminal law. If the statutes that might possibly be enforced against respondents are valid laws, and if charges under these
statutes are not improvidently made or pressed, the question becomes whether
any perceived threat to respondents is sufficiently real and immediate to show
an existing controversy simply because they anticipate violating lawful criminal
statutes and being tried for their offenses, in which event they may appear
before petitioners and, if they do, will be affected by the allegedly illegal conduct
charged. Apparently, the proposition is that if respondents proceed to violate
an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any
proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed. But it seems to us that
attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged
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It is unclear why the Court would couch its O'Shea holding in
terms of "case or controversy" and yet find a live dispute in Steffel.
Both cases involved allegations of past conduct with an inference of
anticipated similar future conduct; the only apparent difference is
that Steffel included a challenge to the statute as applied while
O'Shea did not. Steffel was unique in its recognition of a live controversy over whether a statute constitutionally can be applied to a
plaintiff's future conduct, based upon an assertion that it will take
the same form as past conduct and absent any challenge to the
statute's facial validity. Steffel thus opened the door for those engaged in an active dispute with the state over the bounds of protected activity to litigate their claims of constitutional protection,
at least with respect to past conduct, when they expect to engage
in similar future conduct. The key problem thus becomes the extent
to which such an adjudication will be res judicata with respect to
future conduct, a question that turns initially on whether the challenge to the statute is facial or as applied.
The Court in Steffel did not address the question of the scope of
res judicata effects as a whole but instead seperated determination
of the existence of a live controversy from consideration of the propriety of hearing a pre-enforcement challenge to the statute on its
face. Regarding existence of a live controversy, the Court merely
with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the
area of speculation and conjecture.
Id. at 676.
This rationale almost completely rejects the idea that a criminal defendant is entitled to
nondiscriminatory treatment even if guilty under a valid statute. Moreover, there were sufficient allegations that plaintiffs could expect to be arrested if they joined in protest activities
arguably protected by the first amendment and that they would have difficulty presenting
defenses if the defendants' discriminatory actions continued. One underlying reason for the
Court's action appears to have been the presence of what it thought to be adequate remedies
at law. The Court noted possible problems in later enforcement of equitable relief that would
require intervention into state trials. 94 S. Ct. at 676. It also suggested statutory remedies
such as substitution of judges, changes of venue, and direct and collateral review. Id. at 67780. All of these seem manifestly inadequate, however. See Kates, Immunity of State Judges
Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. Ray. 615
(1970). The Court also relied on the availability of disciplinary and criminal sanctions against
the judges. 94 S. Ct. at 679. It seems odd, however, that these remedies, available to public
officials, can be thought adequate to preclude equitable relief for.private litigants.
Another explanation for the Court's holding might be expiressed fear of a federal court's
inability to police its orders. Citing only City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966),
(civil rights removal case), the Court stated: "The Court of Appeals disclaimed any intention
of requiring the District Court to sit in constant day-to-day supervision of these judicial
officers, but the 'periodic reporting' system it thought might be warranted would constitute
a form of monitoring of the operation of state court functions that is antipathetic to established principles of comity." 94 S. Ct. at 679.
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pointed to the threats made to Steffel and the prosecution of his
friend. Citing only Epperson v. Arkansas,7 5 a pre-enforcement facial
challenge, it stated: "In these circumstances, it is not necessary that
petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be
entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of
6
his constitutional rights. ' 7
Regarding the nature of attack upon the statute, the state in
Steffel urged: "[A]lthough it may be appropriate to issue a declaratory judgment when no state criminal proceeding is pending and
the attack is upon the facial validity of a state criminal statute, such
a step would be improper where, as here, the attack is merely upon
the constitutionality of the statute as applied, since the State's
interest in unencumbered enforcement of its laws outweighs the
minimal federal interest in protecting the constitutional rights of
only a single individual." 7 This argument was based on the Court's

statements in Cameron v. JohnsonO that the state should have the
initial opportunity to decide guilt or innocence and that the mere
possibility of the statute being applied erroneously does not
threaten irreparable harm sufficiently to justify disruption of orderly state proceedings.7 9 The Steffel Court noted, however, that
this language referred to whether the state was proceeding in good
faith in a pending state prosecution and stated that the issuance of
declaratory relief when no proceeding was pending actually would
be less disruptive in a challenge to the statute as applied than in a
challenge to the face of the statute, since the latter might result in
holding an entire state program unconstitutional."0
The state more plausibly could have argued that a declaratory
judgment that particular conduct is constitutionally protected
might not be binding in a subsequent proceeding if the declaratory
judgment action concerned only past incidents, not future conduct.
A federal declaratory judgment can deal only with the facts litigated. To the extent that the declaratory judgment is prospective
at all, it must be much like a letter ruling from the Internal Revenue
Service regarding the taxability of a particular transaction; because
the ruling is valid only "if the facts presented [therein] are true,"
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

393 U.S. 97 (1968). See note 71 supra.
94 S. Ct. at 1216.
Id. at 1223.
390 U.S. 611 (1968). See notes 40-42 supra & accompanying text.
390 U.S. at 621.
94 S. Ct. at 1222-24.
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it cannot foreclose taxation if there is any legally significant factual
variation from the transaction as proposed to the Service. 8'
Similarly, a declaratory judgment that the trespass statute could
not be applied to the type of handbilling in which Steffel had engaged previously might not be controlling if he were to be arrested
later for handbilling at a different time in a different place. Such
possible variances explain the Court's past reluctance to issue declaratory judgments in advance of conduct by the challenger. 2 If a
subsequent criminal prosecution differs in a constitutionally significant way from the facts presented in the declaratory judgment action, an injunction should not issue to effectuate the prior judgment;"' such a case would concern stare decisis rather than res judicata, and the determination of the stare decisis effect of the declaratory judgment would be left initially to state, rather than federal,
courts.84 If the challenge to the statute was facial, of course, there
would be no need later to determine whether the declaratory judgment would have res judicata effect on a criminal prosecution.
To illustrate these principles, assume that Steffel obtained the
requested declaratory judgment, then returned to the same shopping center to distribute leaflets reflecting his views on prison reform. If, when again arrested under the state criminal trespass statute, he sought injunctive relief in federal court against his state
prosecution, the injunction should be denied only if a constitutionally cognizable variance in the fact pattern could be shown. It
should not be constitutionally relevant that the leaflets were on a
different subject than in the prior litigation, but the state might be
able to show that he was arrested only after an angry crowd threatened immediate harm to him and the store in which he was conducting his activities. The existence of a hostile crowd would be a constitutionally significant factual variance from the prior litigation. This
distinction, of course, provides opportunities to evade federal declaratory judgments by alleging arguably frivolous factual disparities,
but the hostile-crowd test, which saves this hypothetical police ac81. Rev. Proc. 72-3, § 13.02, 1972-1 CuM. BuL. 705.
82. See, e.g., A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961);
International Longshoremen's Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954). See generally C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRnS 449 (2d ed. 1970).
83. Justice Rehnquist's Steffel opinion would be correct in such a case. See notes 58.62
supra & accompanying text.
84. Apparently it has never been suggested that the stare decisis effect of a federal court's
judgment in a separate dispute requires an injunction against state court proceedings to
"protect or effectuate" the federal judgment. For a discussion of the stare decisis effects of
federal rulings on subsequent state court actions, see notes 87-128 infra & accompanying text.
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tion, is itself the result of the Supreme Court's own previously expressed attitudes regarding the arrest of an unpopular speaker." In
situations subject to a broader constitutional rule that makes fewer
facts relevant, similar factual variations may not be constitutionally
significant.
Steffel has created a whole new range of remedial problems for the
federal courts, but most of these problems can be solved if it is
remembbred that a declaratory judgment is res judicata only of the
situation presented to the court. Constitutionally significant
changes in the fact situation should preclude bootstrapping issuance of federal injunctive relief, but variations without constitutional significance should leave a federal court free to issue injunctive relief to protect its own judgments.8
Stare Decisis
The second question raised by Justice Rehnquist's footnote in
Steffel" concerns the stare decisis effect of a federal declaratory
judgment in a later state prosecution concerning facts sufficiently
different to preclude application of res judicata. Some recent cases
in which state courts have refused to follow constitutional interpretations by lower federal courts within their territorial jurisdictions
raise what appears to be the converse of the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v.Tompkins.8 In Erie the Supreme Court held that federal
courts deciding issues of common law were bound constitutionally
by the decisions of the highest court in the state in which they were
sitting.9 This rule was based upon the practical need for uniformity
85. Supreme Court precedents dealing with the hostile-crowd situation require a full factual development of the incident to enable the court to determine whether the police should
have restrained the crowd or whether, in fact, it was the defendant's own "fighting words"
that created the situation that resulted in his vulnerability to criminal prosecution. See
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Feinerv. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
86. It might be asked why this analysis does not apply when a state prosecution already is
pending when federal declaratory relief is sought. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
In this situation the federal court must foresee whether it could effectuate its judgment by a
subsequent injunction; if not, it would be issuing an advisory opinion. Although a declaratory
judgment can be issued without showing irreparable harm, injunctive relief requires such a
showing, nearly an impossibility in the normal criminal prosecution. Thus the court should
avoid later difficulties by withholding declaratory relief initially.
87. See notes 63-64 supra & accompanying text.
88. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Much of the discussion on the converse Erie doctrine is based on a
paper submitted for course credit at the University of Georgia School of Law by Mr. J.
Stanley Hawkins.
89. 304 U.S. at 79.
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of decisions within each state" as well as the jurisprudential notion
that law derives not only from legislative sources but also from
judicial decisions."
Although these aspects of the Erie rationale would appear to support according a similar precedential value to federal court pronouncements of constitutional law, the state courts have not always
considered themselves constrained by federal court opinions. In
1964 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
in Hornsby v. Allen 2 that a local governmental agency acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity when considering a liquor license application and that fundamental due process requirements therefore are
applicable to such administrative proceedings. 3 The court declared
ineffective the Georgia legislature's attempt to classify a liquor license by statute as a privilege subject to the unfettered discretion
of the licensing authority."' In 1972, however, the Georgia Supreme
Court enforced the legislature's privilege language in Massell v.
Leathers,9" reversing an injunction issued against a city that had
refused to issue a liquor license. The court stated that since the
permits constituted a privilege, the question of whether to issue a
permit falls within the broad discretion of the municipality's governing authority. After reciting the relevant Georgia law, the court
summarily distinguished as inapposite United States Supreme
Court cases involving administrative due process 97 and concluded
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 79.
326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 608.

94. GA. CoDE ANN. § 58-718 (1965) provides, in pertinent part:

The privilege of manufacturing, distributing and selling by wholesale or retail
of beverages provided in this Chapter is purely a privilege and no business
legalized by this Chapter shall be conducted in any county or incorporated
municipality of this State without a permit from the governing authority of such
county or municipality, which said authority is hereby given discretionary powers as to the granting or refusal of such permits.
The statute was not declared unconstitutional; rather, the court held that the privilege
language was not sufficient to eliminate the requirement for due process and directed the trial
court to evaluate the procedures of the licensing authority to determine whether due process
was accorded to applicants. 326 F.2d at 609, 612.
95. 229 Ga. 503, 192 S.E.2d 379 (1972).
96. Id. at 503, 192 S.E.2d at 380, citing Harbin v. Holcomb, 181 Ga. 800, 184 S.E. 603
(1935).
97. 229 Ga. at 504, 192 S.E.2d at 380. The Massell court distinguished its case from
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (refusal of the state board of bar
examiners to allow petitioner to take bar exam), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(South Carolina statute abridged appellant's rights to the free exercise of religion), and
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tersely: "The case of Hornsby v. Allen is not controlling on this
' In a vigorous dissent,99 Justice Gunter noted the death of
court."98
the "right-privilege" doctrine in Goldberg v. Kelly,"'0 including the
Supreme Court's approval of Hornsby in Goldberg.1"1 Even Justice
Gunter, however, did not assert that Hornsby was controlling authority.
Another example of the reverse side of the Erie coin arose in New
0 2 the Court of Appeals
York, where, in United States v. Paroutian,
for the Second Circuit held that, to be admissible, evidence found
after an illegal search must have been discovered on the basis 1of3
something other than information obtained in the illegal search;
actual reliance upon a source of information, independent of that
illegally obtained, had to be shown to "cure the taint."'' A decade
later, however, in People v. Fitzpatrick,"5 the Court of Appeals of
New York, while acknowledging the existence of the contrary federal
court holding,"'6 specifically approved the "inevitable discovery"
rule"0 7 condemned in Paroutian.Justices White and Douglas dissented from the United States Supreme Court denial of certiorari
in Fitzpatrick, I with Justice White expressing concern that the
Paroutian-Fitzpatrickconflict of authorities might pose a dilemma
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state one-year residency requirement for welfare
benefits denied eqtal protection).
98. 229 Ga. at 504, 192 S.E.2d at 380.
99. Id., 192 S.E.2d at 380.
100. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. Id. at 262 n.9.
102. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
103. The court emphasized the need for actual reliance upon untainted evidence, stating:
On the other hand, a showing that the government had sufficient independent
information available so that in the normal course of events it might have
discovered the questioned evidence without an illegal search cannot excuse the
illegality or cure tainted matter. Such a rule would relax the protection of the
right of privacy in the very cases in which, by the government's own admission,
there is no reason for an unlawful search. The better the government's case
against an individual, the freer it would be to invade his privacy. We cannot
accept such a result. The test must be one of actualities, not possibilities.
Id. at 489.
104. "[Ihe burden shifted to the government, which then was under an obligation to
prove that its evidence had an independent origin." Id.
105. 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 554 (1973).
106. Id. at 506, 300 N.E.2d at 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The court's citation indicates that
it considered Paroutiansufficiently analogous to support a contrary result, but the case was
not viewed as controlling authority.
107. For a general discussion of the "inevitable discovery" rule, see Maguire, How to
Unpoison the Fruit,55 J. Cmam. L.C. & P.S. 307, 313-17 (1964).
108. 94 S. Ct. 554 (1973).
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for New York state law enforcement officials."0 9
Realistically, however, there is no dilemma, only the potential for
waste of judicial effort. If law enforcement officials follow the state
rule, they will see inmates who were convicted on the basis of "inevitably discovered" evidence released as a result of habeas corpus
petitions submitted to lower federal courts following the rule of
Paroutian.By use of the federal habeas remedy, improperly convicted inmates will be able to avail themselves by collateral attack
of a federal rule that might not be invoked on appeal of the state
court conviction.110 In the area of criminal procedure at least, state
courts may disregard lower federal court precedent only at the risk
of having their decisions effectively overturned, a process that allows the federal courts to instruct the state courts in federal law.
A more difficult problem is presented to Georgia licensing authorities by the MasseUl-Hornsby conflict. Need they supply the
Hornsby procedural requirements before denying a petition for a
liquor license or revoking a license previously granted? At the moment, the answer depends pragmatically on whether the licensee or
applicant brings suit in federal rather than state court, resulting in
the anomaly of a federal rule of law that means different things to
different persons in the same community, depending on the sagacity
of their respective lawyers. Perhaps of further significance, the federal courts have taken the almost unanimous position that a state
court adjudication would preclude a subsequent federal court action, even on constitutional grounds. '
A few state courts do consider themselves bound on issues of
federal law by the decisions of federal courts sitting in their jurisdiction. In Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,'1 2 the Alabama

Supreme Court stated, without any discussion, that it was bound
by a prior construction of the National Industrial Recovery Act by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 1 3 Likewise, in a case in

which the issue was whether an employee was engaged in interstate
commerce and therefore entitled to benefits under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
If, therefore, there is a decision from a federal court which is
109. rd. at 555.
110. See Townsend v. Sain, 373 U.S. 293 (1963).
111. See cases cited in Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973). Contra,
Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).
112. 230 Ala. 211, 160 So. 530 (1935).
113. Harper v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 73 F.2d 792 (1934).
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decisive of the question here, and especially if the federal deci-

sion is one that is more recent than the one cited from a state
court, it is our duty to follow the federal court rather than the
state court, since the question involved is one upon which the
federal courts have the ultimate right to speak."'
In Waller v. Eanes' Administrator 5 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia was called upon to enforce a federal statute that had
been declared unconstitutional by a federal district court sitting in
Virginia. Because the federal -court's decision had not been appealed, the state court viewed its holding as "settled law in this
jurisdiction.""' 6
The great majority of jurisdictions that have dealt with the ques117
tion hold that they are not bound by lower federal court decisions.
Despite the apparent lack of unanimity on the question, few of the
courts following the majority rule have expressed doubt concerning
its validity,"' though it has been argued that the conflict of authority between state and federal holdings which the majority rule may
spawn at least is no more harmful than the existing differences
among the federal district courts themselves.'19 Only occasionally
has the rule been rationalized by reference to the overall scheme of
a federalized court system. 2 '
114. Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 52 Utah 116, _ 172 P. 725, 727 (1918).
115. 156 Va. 389, 157 S.E. 721 (1931).
116. Id. at 395, 157 S.E. at 723.
117. See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1947).
118. For example, in Commonwealth v. Masskow, 290 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Mass. 1972), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disposed of the issue summarily by stating: "We
are of course hound by decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of federal law, but we
are not concluded by decisions of other Federal courts, although we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive," citing two earlier Massachusetts decisions.
119. E.g., People v. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 544, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 873 (1971) ("[Oiftentimes there is a conflict between decisions of the various Federal
courts on constitutional matters and until finally determined by the United States Supreme
Court there can be no definitive ruling by which a State court can be bound.").
120. In Kenna v. Calumet, H. & S.R.R., 206 l.App. 17 (1917), aft'd, 284 Ill.
301, 120 N.E.
259 (1918), the court reasoned:
If by this counsel mean (and apparently they do) that we are bound by the
decisions not only of the United States Supreme Court, but also of the inferior
federal tribunals, we are unable to sustain their contention. In providing a
system of federal judicature, the Constitutional convention of 1787 first adopted
a resolution which would have vested it exclusively in the Supreme Court of the
United States and inferior federal tribunals. The provision in regard to inferior
federal courts was, however, stricken out for the reason that it was thought that
in interest of economy all original federal jurisdiction should be left to the State
courts. While a compromise was effected which left the creation of inferior
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There is little doubt that state tribunals are an "integral part of
the federal system of judicature";"' that they are not bound by
federal law decisions of the federal courts does not follow, however.
The rule's real genesis stems from a more fundamental feature of
all judicial systems. In complete court systems there are inferior and
superior tribunals, with the latter having power to review the former's decisions in an appellate procedure. These appellate courts
ultimately establish authoritative legal rules, maintaining the integrity of those rules by their power to correct erroneous rulings of
inferior courts. Thus all states recognize the binding authority of the
Supreme Court of the United States because of that court's appellate review power. 2' Because lower federal courts cannot review
directly state court litigation, there is little opportunity to enforce
decisional rules on that level. 23 In criminal cases the federal habeas
federal tribunals to the discretion of Congress, that body, when organized,
adopted, and has since adhered to, a policy of conferring jurisdiction on inferior
federal courts in a limited portion of the cases falling within the Nation's judicial power, while leaving a large, if not the greater, portion to be determined by
the tribunals created and maintained by the States-an arrangement greatly to
the financial advantage of the federal government. It thus transpires that the
State courts are, in fact and by intention, an integral part of the federal system
of judicature, and exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in many, and, with one
exception, concurrent jurisdiction in all the remaining federal civil causes, subject as to the latter to a power of removal in certain instances. We are of the
opinion, therefore, that the conclusions reached in regard to federal questions
by the federal tribunals inferior to the United States Supreme Court, while
persuasive, are not binding upon us, but that in the consideration of such questions the State courts are bound only by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
Id. at 25-26.
121. Id. State courts must hear federal question cases despite any state policy that might
be disrupted by granting relief. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Claflin
v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
When in addition to this we consider the State Governments and the National
Governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of
one whole, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State Courts would
have a concurrent jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the laws of the Union,
where it was not expressly prohibited.
THE FEDERALIsT No. 82, at 574 (H. Dawson ed. 1863).
122. This principle was established despite bitter opposition from the state courts. See
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816).
123. It might be possible for a defeated state court litigant to file a subsequent action in
federal court and not be barred by res judicata. See McCormack, Federalismand Section
1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalClaims, PartI, 60 VA. L. REv.
250 (1974). Congress presumably could grant appellate review power or allow collateral attack
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corpus remedy provides review power to some extent, since the federal court may relitigate all legal issues to determine the constitutionality of a state conviction.' 24 In this sense lower federal courts
do exercise appellate review, although cast in the form of a collateral
decision, indicating that, at least in criminal cases, state courts can
be confined by the practical, if not theoretical, stare decisis effect
of a federal declaratory judgment.'
Beyond the power of review by habeas corpus proceedings, jurisprudential concepts militate in favor of federal court dominance
within their territorial boundaries on matters of federal law. Similar
state court authority was recognized in Erie largely because the
state law is what the state courts say it is;126 in an Austinian sense,

they create law by decreeing the commands of the sovereign.12 As a
corollary, the federal courts are part of a sovereign federal government whose commands cannot be negated by individual state governments.'1 Requiring state courts to adhere to lower federal court
pronouncements of federal law does not make the state court any
more subservient than is the federal court on issues of state law
under Erie. Each is merely authoritative on those matters within its
sovereign realm. In the Steffel context, therefore, a declaratory
judgment of a lower federal court could control subsequent state
court application of the controverted statute, even if a factual difference or a change in parties precluded invoking res judicata concepts.
MONETARY RELIEF

As with its handling of the declaratory judgment, the Supreme
Court in its 1973 term raised questions concerning the longstanding
of state court decisions on all federal question cases. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. Ray. 142, 166-67 (1970); Haynsworth,
A New Court to Improve the Administrationof Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). See also Dent
v. United States, 8 Ariz. 413, 76 P. 455 (1904) (state court held itself bound by federal court
of appeals' construction of statute giving the Secretary of the Interior rulemaking power
regarding use of public forest reservations, where the statute gave the federal court appellate
jurisdiction over the state court).
124. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83
HARv. L. R y. 1038, 1113-18 (1970).
125. Stare decisis implies, however, that the state court should be given the initial opportunity to decide an issue free of a federal injunction. See note 84 supra & accompanying text.
126. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
127. See J. AUsTN, LEcruas ON JumispU)ENca (5th ed. 1885).
128. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378,
397 (1932).
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problem of the availability of monetary relief against states or state
officials in the exercise of their official duties. Edelman v. Jordan,"

was a private challenge to state procedures for awarding welfare
payments in a manner conflicting with the requirements of the fed-

eral act under which the program was administered. 30 The plaintiffs

sought both prospective relief, to require future compliance with
federal law, and retrospective relief, to require payment of amounts
wrongfully withheld since the effective date of the federal legisla-

tion. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of
retroactive relief, holding that the payment of these past due
amounts was a form of "equitable restitution" not barred by the

eleventh amendment.1 31 The Supreme Court, however, viewed the
award as one of legal damages against the state, rather than equitable relief against the officials, because it was "measured in terms
of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on
the part of the defendant state officials."'3
Although EdeIman appears to be a regression in the expansion of
constitutional remedies, a close reading reveals its consistency with

previous developments in this difficult area of eleventh amendment
restrictions upon suits to enforce federal claims against states and

state officials. The breadth of some of the Court's language, however, at a time when the lower courts needed guidance from a tightly
drawn opinion, is regrettable.
129. 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
130. In a companion case, the Supreme Court indicated that the state procedures also
might constitute a denial of equal protection. Hagans v. Lavine, 94 S. Ct. 1372 (1974). See
Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1351 n.1 (1974).
131. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973). U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the language of the amendment refers only to suits by citizens of "another State" and of "any Foreign State," it
consistently has been held applicable to suits against a state by its own citizens at least since
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
132. 94 S. Ct. at 1358. Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between damages,
which are not available against a state, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and equitable
relief, which may be available even if it depletes the state's treasury. See, e.g., Georgia R.R.
& Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). But see In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1883). See generallyMcCormack, supranote 123, at 277-85.
Even though the state was not named as a party in Edelman, the Court had little difficulty
invoking the eleventh amendment bar, relying on the following language from Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, (1945): "[Wlhen the action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest
and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials
are nominal defendants." 94 S.Ct. at 1356.
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Modern eleventh amendment analysis proceeds most often from
Ex parte Young,' in which the Supreme Court held the eleventh
amendment inapplicable to suits against state officers who allegedly
acted unconstitutionally, since the state could not authorize unconstitutional action and thus the officer could not benefit from any
state immunity from suit.'34 It often has been said that the eleventh
amendment created a form of sovereign immunity for state governments;35 the terms of the amendment, however, only purport to
withdraw a portion of the Supreme Court's diversity jurisdiction
following Chisholm v. Georgia.' An expansive reading of the
amendment is totally unwarranted by its history, which indicates
that the amendment was not intended to reclaim the delegation of
sovereignty extended to the federal government under the terms of
the Constitution. 3 A narrower reading would provide no immunity
to states in those areas in which they have, by ratification of the
Constitution, accepted the legislative or judicial sovereignty of the
United States. The failure of this rationale to win favor in the Supreme Court, however, coupled with recognition of equitable jurisdiction over state officers under the Ex parte Young rationale, has
generated confusion.
Prospective and Retroactive Relief
Not only has the Court occasionally provided remedies against
prospective state conduct, it also ihas granted some relief, including
money damages,. to individuals aggrieved by past state action. '" A
133. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
134. Id. at 149-61.
135. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Although occasional casual references have been made to sovereign immunity concepts of the eleventh amendment, most commentators, upon careful analysis, contend that the amendment should not be read so broadly. See C. JAcoBs, THE ELEvENTH
AMENDmENT AND SOVEREIGN ImmuNrry (1972); L. JAFn, supra note 30, at 220-22; Gutherie, The
Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 8 CoLuM. L. Rv.
183 (1908).
136. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (state held amenable to suit by citizens of another state).
137. See Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See
also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821), where the court stated: "That
its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a state from the degradation supposed to
attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the
terms of the amendment. . . .We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause
than the dignity of a state." Chief Justice Marshall then demonstrated that the "other cause"
was the shielding of states from payment of their heavy debts. Id. at 407.
138. No clear examples of this form of relief exist, but in several cases similar to Edelman
the Court has affirmed without discussion lower court awards of retroactive payments. See
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functional analysis of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that the
Court has attempted to distinguish between those remedies which
would authorize wholesale invasion of the state treasury or substantially disrupt state revenue programs and those remedies which
could provide only individualized relief from a particular state revenue action.' If the Court consistently provided relief for individualized grievances, then the eleventh amendment would be merely a
warning to proceed carefully in structuring equitable remedies to
avoid endangering an entire state revenue program.
Edelman perpetuates a distinction based on the pervasiveness of
the remedy by authorizing only prospective relief. It is not clear,
however, why prospective relief that invades a state treasury is permissible under the eleventh amefidment while similar retroactive
relief is not. If the eleventh amendment were a complete jurisdictional bar, then prospective relief also should not be available since
jurisdictional questions must be determined before a remedy can be
framed."' But if the eleventh amendment stands only as a principle
of limited immunity, then its impact can be assessed in particular
cases under traditional concepts of appropriate relief.
The eleventh amendment has not been viewed as a true jurisdictional bar,' despite its reference to "judicial power"; thus an avenue deliberately may have been left open for the recovery of monetary relief when "equitable j.risdiction" is appropriate. 42 The Court
94 S. Ct. at 1359 & n.13. Some damage awards against state officials have been authorized
where indemnification by the state was likely. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). With the added factors of a suit by a federal
entity and a separate fund in the state treasury, the Court ordered monetary relief in Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
139. See L. JAns, supra note 30, at 221.
140. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Of course, the term "equitable jurisdiction"
often is used loosely to describe the proper circumstances under which equitable relief may
be granted, but this question is not truly one of jurisdiction, which involves the power of the
court to grant relief.
141. The Court in Edelman did reject a contention that the state was foreclosed from
raising an eleventh amendment argument by its failure to raise it in the trial court, saying
that the "defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need
not be raised in the trial court." 94 S. Ct. at 1363.
142. The Edelman Court noted:
The Court of Appeals, in upholding the award in this case, held that it was
permissible because it was in the form of "equitable restitution" instead of
damages, and therefore capable of being tailored in such a way as to minimize
disruptions of the state program of categorical assistance. But we must judge
the award actually made in this case, and not one which might have been
differently tailored in a different case, and we must judge it in the context of
the important constitutional principle embodied in the eleventh amendment.
Id. at 1357.
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emphasized that retroactive and prospective relief each impact differently upon the state treasury, noting particularly the substantial
effect of retroactive relief upon the finite amount of state funds
available to operate a welfare program. Moreover, the passage of
time would make the payment of previously unpaid welfare benefits
less valuable to the recipient, while accumulation of retroactive
payments would become increasingly burdensome to the state.'
The considerations of the Edelman Court were phrased in the language of equity, balancing state concerns against the individual's
interests in a particular form of relief. This balancing of the equities
by the Court implicitly rejects a jurisdictional analysis of the eleventh amendment, intentionally holding open the possibility of relief
in a more appropriate case. The "important constitutional principle
embodied in the eleventh amendment"' 4 is in fact careful application of ancient equitable doctrines.'
The Court phrased its test for determining when relief is appropriate in terms that would foreclose most awards of retroactive payments. An award of retroactive welfare payments resembled an
award of damages against the state because it was "measured in
terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty
on the part of the defendant state officials."' 47 The Court acknowledged that it repeatedly had authorized prospective equitable relief
necessitating payment of money from the state treasury, but distinguished those cases because of their "ancillary effect on the state
treasury" as a "necessary result of compliance with decrees which
143. Id. at 1357 n.11.
144. Id. The Edelman Court here quoted from Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d
Cir. 1972):
The second federal policy which might arguably be furthered by retroactive
payments is the fundamental goal of congressional welfare legislation-the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of impoverished persons. Federal standards
are designed to ensure that those needs are equitably met; and there may perhaps be cases in which the prompt payment of funds wrongfully withheld will
serve that end. As time goes by, however, retroactive payments become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence between previously ascertained
and existing needs becomes less clear.
145. See note 142 supra.
146. The court of appeals had stated that a court "[i]n determining whether to order the
retroactive payment of benefits [is]
exercising [its] equity powers and hence must engage
in a balancing process." Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 n.14 (7th Cir. 1973). Although
the state did not raise an argument based on equitable principles, apparently only attempting
to establish a jurisdictional bar, the court of appeals briefly scanned the equities and noted
the state's awareness that the payments were being withheld in contravention of the federal
requirements. Id.
147. 94 S. Ct. at 1358.
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by their terms were prospective in nature."1 8 Much emphasis was
placed upon whether the breach of obligation by state officials occurred before or after a court decree,' implying that only a court
could place an enforceable legal obligation upon a state official to
conform to federal law. The distinction between a breach of judicially imposed duties and a breach of statutory duties is unclear,
however; a statutory duty is as much a decree of the sovereign
federal government as is a court-imposed duty. The only difference
between the two might be the greater clarity with which the judically imposed obligation is stated, but this distinction merely recognizes the relevance in an equity proceeding of the defendant's
knowledge that he is violating a federal duty, whether statutory or
judicial. Such knowledge should be only one factor to be balanced
in a purely equitable approach.
The Waiver Rationale
One disturbing aspect of Edelman is that even the dissenters,
except Justice Brennan, thought it necessary to find a waiver by the
state of its eleventh amendment immunity. This waiver rationale'
has gained popularity steadily in the past decade in cases dealing
with enforcement of federal statutory duties against state officials.
In Edelman the Court admitted that a waiver could be found by
state participation in a federal program, but only "'by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text [of the federal statute] .. ."'151
'.
The waiver theory originated
in Parden v. Terminal Railway1 2 when an injured employee of a
state-owned railroad recovered benefits provided by the Federal
Employer's Liability Act. The eleventh amendment was held inapplicable to areas that came under congressional control, since the
states had delegated those aspects of sovereignty to the federal government; because operation of a railroad in interstate commerce fell
under Congress' commerce power, the state could not claim sover148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The waiver theory indicates that eleventh amendment immunity is not a jurisdictional bar, since subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be created by waiver
or consent. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); People's Bank v. Calhoun,
102 U.S. 256, 260 (1880); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804). But see note
141 supra.Analogizing to sovereign immunity, however, the eleventh amendment would leave
a state free to consent to suits of a certain kind.
151. 94 S. Ct. at 1361, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
152. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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eign immunity." 3 Unfortunately, the Court also ruled that, by its
operation of a railroad within the Act's interstate commerce coverage, the state had waived its right to rely upon sovereign immunity.'54 The addition of this waiver rationale has caused difficulties
ever since.
The Court reasoned in Parden that Congress had

" . . .

condi-

tioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon
amenability to suit in federal court, as provided- by the Act; by
thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama
must be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have
consented to suit.' 5 5 Reliance on a governmental-proprietary distinction bolstered this waiver theory:
[W]hen a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own
and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it
subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private
person or corporation.... States have entered and are entering
numerous forms of activity which, if carried on by a private
person or corporation, would be subject to federal regulation.' 5'
This reasoning indicates that a state may assert its immunity if
engaged in activities that are "uniquely governmental." Modern
governmental activities, however, are increasingly difficult to distinguish from private activities. For example, were the welfare payments in Edelman more closely related to private charitable activities or to traditional governmental benefits? Is it "governmental" to
hire employees or is it instead something not exclusively within the
realm of state activity since private employers act similarly? Does
characterization of employment as "uniquely governmental" depend upon the type of activity in which the employees are engaged
with the result that a state hospital employee might work under a
waiver of sovereign immunity while a state highway worker would
not? By tracing the Justices' individual views, a strong tendency to
frame the test in terms of a governmental-proprietary distinction
can be found. The majority in Parden consisted of Justice Brennan
and four others no longer on the Court.' 7 The dissenters, Justices
White, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart, three of whom remain on the
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
Court.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 192-97.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 196-97.
Justices Warren, Black, Clark, and Goldberg joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the
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Court, have found new allies in Justices Marshall, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, and Burger. This new-found support appeared in both
Edelman and a 1973 case, Employees v. Department of Public
Health and Welfare.' 8
In Employees, Justice Douglas found that Congress did not intend to sanction private suits against state employers for recovery
of backpay when it amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to extend minimum-wage coverage to state agencies.' 5 Over Douglas'
dissent, the Court previously had held in a declaratory judgment
that Congress could regulate the wages and hours of state employees
in hospitals and schools, although foreseeing serious questions about
the availability of particular forms of relief for state violations of
these regulations.' 0 In Employees, the Court held that, by not mentioning specifically the availability of state employees' suits, Congress did not intend to require a waiver of sovereign immunity as a
condition of continued operation of schools and hospitals under the
terms of the Act.'6' This strict requirement of an unequivocal waiver
evolved from the ruling in Parden that the state had waived its
sovereign immunity by operating in an area in which Congress had
conditioned the right. 62 Following this reasoning, however, leads to
the assertion that, if Congress cannot withhold the right of a state
to conduct an activity, then it should not be able to impose conditions upon the conduct of the activity. ' Thus, regardless of Congressional intent, no waiver would be found in the employment of
people to perform essential governmental services. Since the waiver
rationale implies that Congress cannot regulate what it cannot prohibit, the Court's subsequent insistance in Edelman upon a clear
waiver of immunity presages difficulty for future attempts by private parties to assert the full force of federal regulatory measures
against state governments.
For example, after the Employees decision, Congress amended
158. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
159. Id. at 285. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ 102(b), 80 Stat. 831, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
160. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
161. 411 U.S. at 284.
162. Id. at 282-83.
163. A substantial body of commentary argues that the receipt of a benefit cannot be
conditioned upon forebearance of an individual's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hale,
UnconstitutionalConditionsand ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLum. L. Rav. 321 (1935); Reich,
The New Property,73 YALm L.J. 733 (1964); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,73 HAv. L.
Rv. 1595 (1960). But a strategic waiver of constitutional rights may be made if knowing and
voluntary, and the Court seems to require such a waiver of state sovereign immunity.
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section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically to permit
private suits against public employers for back pay wrongfully withheld in violation of the minimum-wage or maximum-hours provisions."5 4 It is extremely doubtful that this provision can survive intact; most members of the present Court seem firmly committed to
the Parden waiver rationale, with three of them, including Justice
Douglas,'65 having applied it in dissent in Edelman."' Regarding
regulation of employment, two extreme theories of state-federal relations are represented: Justice Brennan's view that the states have
waived all sovereignty in the field of interstate commerce and Justice Douglas' view that the tenth amendment' 7 immunizes all state
actions from federal regulations. Except for these two Justices, the
Court seems to be compromising by looking for a waiver in each
particular activity subject to congressional regulation, indicating a
return to a governmental-proprietary distinction to "draw the
constitutional line between the state as government and the state
as trader.' "16
Suits by the Federal Government
Another issue suggested by Edelman is whether a suit by the
United States might be precluded by state immunity. The Court
repeatedly has asserted that the eleventh amendment is no jurisdictional bar to suits by the United States against a state government.' 9 Yet even in upholding regulation of state activities by the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court expressed some doubt regard164. Act of April 8,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S.C. §
203(d) (1970).
165. In Edelman Justice Douglas relied on the waiver rationale of Pardenwithout mentioning his dissent in that case. Apparently, in Parden he was concerned with state immunity
from regulation, not litigation, later developing his position on regulation, premised upon the
tenth amendment, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
Presumably, this distinction also explains Justice Douglas' opinion in Employees. See notes
159-61 supra & accompanying text.
166. Justices Marshall and Blackmun found a waiver bolstered by the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which they read to provide generally for implied remedies in
federal statutes. 94 S. Ct. at 1369.
167. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
168. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
169. See, eg., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621, 641 (1892). The Court in Edelman endorsed the proposition that the eleventh
amendment is not now interpreted to bar suits against a state by the United States. 94 S.
Ct. at 1359 (dictum).
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ing the availability of adequate enforcement remedies,170 doubt that
could be extended to question whether the United States can sue
to obtain backpay for employees damaged by violations of the Act.
It is already accepted that a state cannot act as parens patriae for
its citizens in suits against the United States"' or against commercial entities under federal law;1 2 although the United States may
act as parens patriae for its citizens against private employers, it
might not be accorded that position against state governments in
economic affairs. Although the Court has indicated that the right
of the federal government to recover against a state government
under a federal statute exists to the full extent of the power of
Congress to enact the statute,7 3 the prior cases of this type have
involved either state commercial activities beyond the scope of traditional governmental action'74 or protection of some distinctly federal interest such as that in interstate disputes,' governmental
taxing power, 7 1 or protection of federal proprietary interests. 117
When the federal government has a proprietary interest, the
Court has been conscious of the correlative interest of the state,
indicating an unarticulated reliance on equitable principles. For
17 8
the federal governexample, in United States v. North Carolina,
ment attempted to recover interest on state bonds from the date of
maturity to the date of redemption. The Court dealt strictly with
state law by holding that the post-maturity interest would not be
available, but indicated that something like sovereign immunity
influenced its holding, stating that interest "is not to be awarded
against a sovereign government, unless its consent to pay interest
has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or by a lawful
contract of its executive officers."'' 7 In light of Edelman, this language implies that consent to suit will be just as necessary when the
federal government is the plaintiff as when an employee is the plaintiff.
170. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968).

171. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
172. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
173. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1936).
174. See, e.g., United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (application of Safety
Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 2,6 (1970), to state railroad).
175. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621 (1892).

176. See, e.g., Department of Employmentv. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966); NewYork
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
177. See, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 216.
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Some decisions in the area of intergovernmental immunities have
recognized a distinction between regulation and taxation. Federal
regulation of state activities has been upheld more easily as nondiscriminatory than has taxation, which often raises the specter of
destroying one government through taxation by another.'80 Although
suits by the Secretary of Labor to recover backpay for employees
arguably are merely a means to obtain relief that could not be
obtained by the employees themselves, the remedy is as essential
in the regulatory program of the federal government as are suits to
enforce future compliance with federal law. Hopefully, the eleventh
amendment and sovereign immunity will continue to be viewed not
to bar federal suits to obtain relief for past wrongs. The only limitation upon these suits should be through traditional principles of
equitable relief, permitting the state in an appropriate case to plead
that the equities weigh in its favor rather than in favor of the federal
government.
DistinguishingLegal from Equitable Relief
While reaffirming the need to distinguish between equitable and
legal relief in Edelman during its 1973 term, the Court also provided
some guidance for characterizing particular forms of relief in Curtis
v. Loether.'8' In Curtis the Court held that a defendant in a suit for
damages flowing from racial discrimination under the fair housing
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 196882 is entitled to a jury trial.
For the purposes of determining the legal or equitable nature of an
issue with regard to the seventh amendment, 113the court cautioned:
"[W]e need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any award of
monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief."18 Rather than a
mechanical test depending on the presence of a request for monetary
damages, therefore, the Court relied upon historical analogy to
180. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936):
The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution .... The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities from federal taxation, on which respondent relies, is not illuminating . . . . [W]e look to the

activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce.
181. 94 S.Ct. 1005 (1974).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
183. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
184. 94 S.Ct. at 1009.
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equate racially discriminatory housing with dignitary torts traditionally tried with the help of a jury."" It characterized the statutory
duty of nondiscrimination as a "new legal duty," authorizing compensation to a plaintiff for injury resulting from the defendant's
wrongful breach.' By its own resort to historical analogy, the Court
acknowledged the usefulness of such a method to indicate the legal
or equitable nature of a particular claim.18 7
One other tool the Court found to be "instructive"'18 was a comparison of the housing discrimination claim in Curtisto lower court
decisions that had found jury trial to be unnecessary in the determination of liability for reinstatement and backpay under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89 These cases had theorized that backpay may be awarded through the court's "clean-up" powers following equitable relief of reinstatement,"'0 since it was a form of restitution "requiring the defendant to disgorge funds wrongfully withheld
from the plaintiff."'91 Of course, this description easily could have
been applied to the welfare benefits wrongfully withheld in
Edelman.12 Historically, however, restitution has encompassed only
the return of money wrongfully taken by the defendant from the
plaintiff. Possibly, the state would have a stronger equitable defense
against retroactive payment of welfare benefits than backpay
awards because of the greater impact that retroactive welfare payments would have upon the state treasury and the arguably greater
claim of a present or wrongfully discharged employee to backpay.
It is often dangerous to borrow a concept from one area of the law
and apply it in another, such as application of the equitable characterization of backpay awards. for seventh amendment purposes to
the question of equitable relief against a state government under the
eleventh amendment. The analysis in Curtis, however, is noteworthy for its reliance upon historical analogies to determine whether
a form of relief under statutory provisions is "legal" or "equitable."
185. Id.
186. Id. Similar language was used in Edelman, see note 132 supra& accompanying text.
187. The Court also recognized that insistence upon a jury trial could dismember some
statutory schemes, such as those in bankruptcy and administrative proceedings. 94 S.Ct. at
1008-09.
188. Id. at 1009.
189. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
190. See Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970).
191. 94 S. Ct. at 1010.
192. The court of appeals had characterized the relief sought as "restitution." See note 131
supra & accompanying text.
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Reliance upon history could be extremely helpful to an assessment

of the the propriety of relief in many contexts, since the English
common law allowed many forms of equitable relief to control governmental action even when they impinged upon the treasury of the
Crown.' 3
CONCLUSION

In its October 1973 term, the Supreme Court considered the availability of two remedies that have proved troublesome for the federal
courts: the declaratory judgment affecting state criminal prosecutions, and the award of monetary damages against a state or state
official. An understanding of each remedy requires careful distinction between legal and equitable doctrines. Curtis v. Loether illustrated the importance of historical analysis when such distinctions
are drawn, especially in actions against states or state officials, such
as in Edelman v. Jordan.In this context, the meticulous application
of equitable principles demonstrates that the eleventh amendment
should operate as something other than an absolute immunity
against suit for states. Only when the impairment of the state's
treasury would outweigh the equities of the deprived plaintiff's
claim should the eleventh amendment bar the action; a similar
analysis lends credibility to the retroactive-prospective distinction
used in Edelman.
Appreciation of the difference between the doctrines of abstention
and equitable non-intervention was furthered by Steffel v.
Thompson, setting forth more clearly the proper grounds for declaratory and equitable relief to prevent infringement of federal constitutional rights by state criminal sanctions. Although concurring
opinions in Steffel have raised questions regarding the effects of a
declaratory judgment once granted, these questions can be answered by applying concepts of res judicata and stare decisis. Careful adherence to principles of res judicata will permit subsequent
enforcement of a declaratory judgment in cases of identical disputes, while stare decisis effects can be given to the federal judgment in other situations. Proper respect thus can be maintained for
the judgments of lower federal courts and the anomaly of differing
rules of federal law within the same jurisdiction can be eliminated.
193. L.

JAFFE, supra note 30, at 211.

